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Abstract 
We have developed an evolutionary game model, where agents can choose between two 
forms of social participation: interaction via online social networks and interaction by 
exclusive means of face-to-face encounters. We illustrate the societal dynamics that the 
model predicts, in light of the empirical evidence provided by previous literature. We 
then assess their welfare implications. We show that dynamics, starting from a world in 
which online social interaction is less gratifying than offline encounters, will lead to the 
extinction of the sub-population of online networks users, thereby making Facebook 
and alike disappear in the long run. Furthermore, we show that the higher the propensity 
for discrimination between the two sub-populations of socially active individuals, the 
greater the probability that individuals will ultimately segregate themselves, making 
society fall into a social poverty trap. 
JEL codes: C73, D85, O33, Z13 
Keywords: Evolutionary dynamics; social networks; segregation; dynamics of social 
interaction; social networking sites.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
1
 Department of Economics and Business, University of Sassari, Italy. Email: antoci@uniss.it. The research of Angelo 
Antoci has been financed by Regione Autonoma della Sardegna (L. R. n. 7, 2007; research project Capitale sociale e 
divari economici regionali). 
2
 Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy.Email: fabio.sabatini@uniroma1.it. 
3
 Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques du Grand-Duché du Luxembourg (STATEC), Agence 
pour la normalisation et l'économie de la connaissance (ANEC), and LCSR National Research University Higher 
School of Economics, Russian Federation. Email: Francesco.Sarracino@statec.etat.lu. 
 2 
 
1. Introduction 
Social interactions affect a variety of behaviors and economic outcomes, including the formation of 
opinions and tastes, investment in human capital, access to jobs and credit, social mobility, 
subjective well-being and the emergence of collective action, to name a few. While face-to-face 
interactions have reportedly been declining in many countries over the last two decades (Putnam, 
2000; Costa and Kahn, 2003; Bartolini and Sarracino, 2014; Sarracino and Mikucka, 2016), 
participation in social networking sites (SNS), such as Facebook and Twitter, has steeply risen 
(Duggan et al., 2015)4. The advent of online social networks has radically changed the way that we 
interact with others and this change can have major economic and welfare consequences. 
In Bowling Alone, Putnam (2000) suggested that technology-based private entertainment, such as 
television, could replace face-to-face meetings and civic engagement in individual preferences. This 
claim was supported by virtually any empirical test on the role of television, which was found to 
displace encounters with friends, associational activities and political participation (e.g., Bruni and 
Stanca, 2008). Following Putnam’s argument about television, early Internet studies advanced the 
“crowding-out hypothesis”, according to which, the Internet use crowds-out social engagement. As 
television, a unidirectional mass medium, displaced so many activities, it stands to reason that the 
Internet, which allows for interactive communication, might induce a more powerful substitution 
effect (DiMaggio et al., 2001). The first empirical studies of the relationship between Internet use 
and face-to-face interactions supported the crowding-out hypothesis (Kraut et al., 1998; Nie et al., 
2002). Subsequent studies, on the other hand, found conflicting results, suggesting that the effect of 
Internet use may vary with users’ preferences and personal characteristics (see, for example, 
Gershuny, 2003; Uslaner, 2004). Yet, these studies are not conclusive: at the time of early studies, 
using the Internet was predominantly a solitary activity that was connected with private 
entertainment. The advent of online social networks radically transformed the way that people use 
the Internet, which largely extended the possibilities to interact with others. 
Despite the extent of the transformations brought by online networking, existing research on the 
relationship between face-to-face interaction and SNS-mediated interaction is limited. There are 
empirical studies on the effect of broadband access on outcomes like social participation and voting 
behavior (e.g., Bauernschuster et al., 2014; Falck et al., 2014). A few authors specifically addressed 
the role of SNS in some aspects of social capital such as face-to-face interaction and trust (Sabatini 
and Sarracino, 2014a; 2015). These works put the crowding-out hypothesis into perspective, 
suggesting that face-to-face and Internet-mediated interaction may rather be complementary. 
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Additionally, while early sociological studies implicitly suggested the risk of segregating the two 
populations of Internet users and socially active individuals, more recent works illustrate the 
emergence of two main types of social actors: those who only interact with others face-to-face and 
those who develop their social life both online and through face-to-face interactions (e.g., 
Bauernschuster et al., 2014; Helliwell and Huang, 2013; Sabatini and Sarracino, 2014a). Theoretical 
studies suggested that the two forms of interaction might be linked to the extent to which 
communicating via the Internet might allow individuals to cope with distance and busyness in the 
preservation of their social life (Antoci et al., 2012a; 2014; 2015). 
In addition, a third population of socially isolated individuals who devote an increasing share of 
their time to work and private consumption seems to be growing in richer and emerging countries 
(Putnam, 2000; Bartolini and Sarracino, 2014; Bartolini and Sarracino, 2015). Antoci et al. (2012b) 
showed how the choice of social isolation might be a rational response, allowing individuals to 
adapt to the relational poverty of the surrounding environment and reduction in leisure time. 
To date, however, we lack a theoretical framework to study how social interaction via SNS relates 
to interaction via physical encounters and the intentional withdrawal from social participation, as 
feared by Putnam (2000) in Bowling Alone. 
We add to previous literature by developing an evolutionary game model of SNS-mediated social 
interaction. In our simplified framework, agents can choose between social interaction and social 
isolation. The latter may be viewed as a drastic form of adaptation to conditions of social decay, 
increasing busyness and declining opportunities for social engagement, which provides constant 
payoffs that are independent from the behaviors of others.  
Following descriptive evidence concerning Italy and the United States (Sabatini and Sarracino, 
2014b; Duggan et al., 2013), we assume that socially active individuals can develop their social 
relationships face-to-face or through online social networks. Those choosing social interaction can 
adopt two alternative strategies: 1) to interact both by means of SNS and face-to-face encounters; 2) 
not to use SNS and to only develop social relationships by means of face-to-face encounters. The 
distinctive trait of these two strategies is the use of SNS5. 
The analysis shows that, depending on the configuration of payoffs and initial distribution of the 
three strategies in the population, different Nash equilibria can be reached. In particular, we found 
that the stationary state, where all individuals choose isolation, is always locally attractive. Thus, it 
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represents a social poverty trap, i.e., an equilibrium, where no one has an interest in interacting with 
others and everybody devotes all of their available time to work or private consumption.  
Only the stationary states in which all individuals play the same strategy can be attractive Nash 
equilibria. The dynamics leading to those states are self-feeding, to the extent to which agents get a 
higher payoff when they interact with agents that adopt the same strategy. When the three stationary 
states are simultaneously attractive, the social poverty trap is always Pareto dominated by the other 
equilibria and, therefore, it can be considered as the worst-case scenario. However, the possibility 
of interacting via SNS offers individuals a coping response that allows “defending” their social life 
from increasing busyness and a reduction in leisure time. This can lead society to an equilibrium in 
which all agents develop their social relationships through a strategy that encompasses participation 
in online social networks. Depending on the configuration of parameters, this may be the second 
best scenario, Pareto dominated by the equilibrium in which everyone interacts by exclusive means 
of physical encounters. In this case, the widening of the agents’ opportunity set for social 
interactions can prevent the achievement of the first best scenario. At the same time, however, it 
allows society to avoid the worst-case scenario of the attractive social poverty trap. In all cases, the 
achievement of a specific equilibrium depends on the initial distribution of the three ways of social 
interaction in the population.  
In this scenario, the propensity for discrimination of socially active individuals defines the structure 
of the basin of attraction of the social poverty trap6. The higher the propensity for discrimination, 
the greater the probability that individuals will ultimately segregate themselves, making society fall 
into the trap.  
Our contribution is related to at least three literatures. The first literature includes empirical studies 
that documented a decline in face-to-face social participation in many countries (Putnam, 2000; 
Costa and Kahn, 2003; Bartolini et al., 2013; Bartolini and Sarracino, 2015). It also includes 
theoretical studies that explain such a decline in connection with the negative externalities of 
growth (Bartolini and Bonatti, 2008; Antoci et al., 2012b; 2013). 
The second literature is by economists who theoretically and empirically analyzed how Internet use 
may affect social capital (Campante et al., 2013; Falck et al., 2014; Bauernschuster et al., 2014; 
Antoci et al., 2012a; 2014; Sabatini and Sarracino, 2014a; 2015). Antoci et al. (2012a; 2014) 
modeled the choice between two ways of social participation, respectively based on Internet-
mediated and face-to-face interaction, in a framework where the time available for social 
participation is exogenously given. Antoci et al. (2015a) added to previous work by including the 
choice to withdraw from social participation. The evolutionary framework that is presented in this 
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paper contributes to this body of research in several ways. First, we introduce a new specification of 
the social interaction mechanism (Section 2.1) that determines the probability of meeting between 
individuals belonging to each of the three sub-populations that we account for. Second, the resulting 
configuration of payoffs (Section 2.2) –which allows the outcomes of interaction to vary according 
to the type of agent with which people are matched–takes into account the propensity for 
discrimination, allowing us to study its dynamic outcomes in terms of segregation. 
The latter aspect links our work to a third literature that refers to theoretical studies on social 
interaction and segregation. Schelling’s (1969; 1971) seminal contribution explained how people’s 
preference for interaction with similar others –and, therefore, for discrimination of different others– 
generates dynamics that naturally lead to segregation. Bischi and Merlone (2011) developed 
Shelling’s work by formalizing a two-dimensional dynamic system to study segregation. The 
authors showed how adaptive rules shape evolutive paths that lead to the emergence of different 
collective behaviors in the long run. When members of a population are characterized by a limited 
tolerance of diversity, the complete separation of different populations may occur. Radi et al. 
(2014a; 2014b) further developed this framework by analyzing the role of regulating institutions 
constraining the number of individuals of a population that are allowed to enter and exit the system.  
Our work adds to this literature by illustrating how the configuration of payoffs drives population 
dynamics towards segregation. If we allow for a configuration of payoffs that reflects a preference 
for interaction with similar others, then dynamics will lead to the complete separation of the three 
populations accounted for in our framework. This is consistent with Bischi and Merlone (2011). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the model and analyze the 
evolutionary dynamics. Sections 4 and 5 present the basic results and classification of dynamic 
regimes. Section 6 discusses the possible dynamics predicted by the model for a specific 
distribution of the different forms of participation suggested by the existing empirical literature. 
Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. The Model 
2.1 The Social Interaction Mechanism 
We consider an economy that is made up of a continuum (of measure one) of identical individuals. 
In each instant of time t, each individual has to choose one of the pure strategies of social 
interaction that are mentioned in the introduction of this paper: 
1) Interaction via online social networks and face-to-face. We call this strategy SN (because its 
distinctive trait is the use of Social Networks). The SN strategy entails different degrees of SNS-
mediated interaction according to individual preferences. In general, we think of SN agents as 
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individuals who develop social ties via SNS at their convenience—for example, by using Facebook 
to stay in touch with friends and acquaintances or for establishing contacts with unknown others—
and meet their contacts in person whenever they want or have time.  
2) Interaction by exclusive means of face-to-face encounters. We call this strategy NS (because its 
players make No use of Social networks). The empirical evidence shows that, despite the steep rise 
in the use of SNS, a remarkable amount of online adults chooses not to use them. 
We take for granted that both strategies encompass the use of other non-SNS mediated online tools 
for social interaction to various extents (e.g., Internet calls, emails, etc.). The distinctive trait of the 
two strategies is the use of SNS for social interaction, which has two remarkable features: it allows 
asynchronous and complex interactions; it generates club effects that may favor segregation to the 
extent to which users get different payoffs when dealing with other users or with non-users. 
3) Social isolation, i.e., a strategy in which agents who prefer to devote all of their time to work and 
to forms of private consumption that do not entail any significant relationship, neither online nor 
face-to-face (Antoci et al., 2015a). We call this strategy NP (for No Participation). NP players tend 
to replace relational goods (e.g., playing a chess tournament with friends) with material goods (e.g., 
a software for playing chess with a computer). We assume that NP agents do not retire from work 
and that their social relations are limited to on the job interactions.  
The withdrawal from social interactions modeled with the NP strategy may be viewed as a drastic 
form of adaptation to conditions of social decay that make NP players’ payoff constant and 
completely independent from the behavior of others. The notion of defensive choices is not new in 
the literature. Hirsch (1976) was the first to introduce the concept of defensive consumption 
induced by negative externalities of growth. This kind of consumption may occur in response to a 
change in the physical or social environment: “If the environment deteriorates, for example, through 
dirtier air or more crowded roads, then a shift in resources to counter these “bads” does not 
represent a change in consumer tastes but a response, on the basis of existing tastes, to a reduction 
in net welfare” (Hirsch, 1976, p. 63). Antoci et al. (2012a; 2013) generalized the study of defensive 
consumption choices to the case of a deteriorating social environment. If the social environment 
deteriorates, for example, in relation to a shift in prevailing social values or decline in the 
opportunities of social engagement, then individuals might want to replace the production and 
consumption of relational goods with the production and consumption of private goods7 . The 
authors suggested that the reduction in the time available for social participation could trigger self-
feeding processes, leading to the progressive erosion of the stock of social capital. 
                                                        
7
 A peculiarity of relational goods is that it is virtually impossible to separate their production from consumption, since 
they coincide (Gui and Sugden, 2005). 
 7 
We indicate the shares of individuals playing strategies SN, NS and NP at time t with, respectively, (), (), ( ), where 	, ,  ≥ 0	 and  +  +  = 1 hold. The social interaction 
mechanism, which determines the payoffs of each strategy, is described by the following 
assumptions: 
1) In each instant of time t, a share l ∈(0,1) of the sub-population of size   and of the sub-
population of size 	 of individuals respectively playing the SN and the NS strategy are enjoying 
their leisure time, which coincides, by assumption, with their social participation time. We say that 
these individuals are in “Lmode”. The remaining share of such sub-populations, 1−l, is currently 
working or engaged in private activities that have no (positive or negative) effect on the payoffs of 
other individuals. We say that these individuals are in “Wmode”. All of the individuals choosing the 
NP strategy, in the instant of time t, are in Wmode. 
2) In each instant of time t, a share n ∈(0,1) of the sub-population of size , composed of Lmode–
individuals playing the SN strategy, is interacting online via a social networking site with 
individuals of the same type, while a share 1-n of such sub-population is interacting via face-to-face 
encounters both with individuals of the same type and individuals belonging to the sub-population 
of size , composed of Lmode -individuals who adopt the NS strategy. 
3) In each instant of time t, an individual choosing either the SN or the NS strategy has an l 
probability of being an Lmode-individual and a 1−l probability of being a Wmode-individual.  
In addition, an Lmode-individual adopting the SN strategy has a n probability of interacting online 
via a social networking site with individuals of the same type (i.e., Lmode-individuals playing SN 
and interacting online via a SNS) and a 1-n probability of interacting via face-to-face encounters 
with individuals of the same type (i.e., Lmode-individuals choosing SN and interacting via face-to-
face encounters) and with Lmode-individuals playing the NS strategy.  
4) In each instant of time t, Lmode-individuals playing the NS strategy interact with Lmode-
individuals playing the same strategy and with the share 1-n of the sub-population of Lmode-
individuals playing the SN strategy and currently interacting via face-to-face encounters.  
The values of the shares l and n are assumed to be exogenously determined (i.e., l and n are 
parameters of the model). 
5) In each instant of time t, every Wmode-individual obtains the payoff α, where α is a strictly 
positive parameter, independently from the strategy (either SN, NS or NP) she adopts, and from the 
distribution , ,   of the strategies in the population. The social interaction between Lmode-
individuals and Wmode-individuals gives players a payoff that is equal to 0. 
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2.2 Expected Payoffs 
We assume that the expected payoff of an individual adopting the SN strategy is given, in each 
instant of time t, by: 
 (, ) = (1 − ) + () + (1 − )(1 − ) +  = = (1 − ) +  + (1 − ) + (1 − ) 
 
Where: 
a) 1 − 	  and 	  are, respectively, the probabilities to be a Wmode-individual and an Lmode-
individual, while	 is the conditional probability to be an Lmode-individual (this happens with 
probability l) interacting online via a SNS (this happens with probability n). Any individual of this 
type interacts via SNS with the sub-population of expected size  of individuals of the same type. 
The parameter  measures the benefit due to this type of interaction. It is important to note that, 
according to this game framework, the value of ln measures either the probability to be an Lmode-
individual interacting online via SNS or the expected share of Lmode-individuals interacting online 
via SNS in the sub-population (of size ) of individuals playing SN. The parameter  measures the 
benefit from being in Wmode and, therefore, 	(1 − )  represents the expected benefit deriving 
from working activity. 
b) (1 − ) is the probability to be an Lmode-individual playing the SN strategy (this happens with 
probability l) and interacting via face-to-face encounters (this happens with probability 1-n). Any 
individual of this type interacts with the sub-population of the expected size (1 − ) , of 
individuals of the same type and with the sub-population of the expected size 		  of Lmode-
individuals playing the NS strategy;  and δ are parameters measuring, respectively, the benefits of 
these two types of interaction. 
Analogously, the expected payoff of an individual adopting the NS strategy is given, in each instant 
of time t, by: 
 (, ) = (1 − ) + (1 − ) +  = = (1 − ) + (1 − ) +  
 
Where  and ε are parameters measuring the benefits of an Lmode-individual adopting NS due to 
the face-to-face interaction with, respectively, the sub-population of expected size   of 
individuals of the same type and sub-population of the expected size (1 − )  of Lmode-
individuals adopting SN and interacting via face-to-face encounters. 
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Finally, the expected payoff of an individual adopting the NP strategy is given, in each instant of 
time t, by: 
  =  > 0 
 
The description of payoffs highlights some points about discrimination. First, a clear separation 
occurs between those who choose to withdraw from social interaction and all the other players. In a 
sense, NP players choose to segregate themselves from the rest of the population. Second, when SN 
players spend their leisure time interacting via SNS, they de facto segregate themselves from the 
two populations of NS and NP players, who do not use online social networks.  
The sub-populations of individuals playing SN and NS can only meet in the context of face-to-face 
interactions. The two extreme cases δ≤0 and ε≤ 0 entail discrimination. In these cases, in fact, when 
individuals adopting different strategies of participation meet face-to-face, they get a null or a 
negative reward. As a result, they will prefer to interact with individuals of their same type. For 
example, SN players may want to check what happens in their online networks while having dinner 
with friends. NS players, who are not familiar with SNS, may, in turn, feel uncomfortable sitting at 
a table where everyone is checking a smartphone instead of talking to each other. If this is the case, 
the benefits ε of the dinner for NS players may be null or negative. At the same time, the 
impossibility to check Facebook during face-to-face interactions –due, for example, to the moral 
obligation to talk– can make SN players feel uncomfortable and anxious (e.g., Shu-Chun et al., 
2012). In this case, the benefits δ of the dinner may be poor or even null or negative for SN players 
too. As a result, SN and NS players might want to discriminate each other in face-to-face 
interactions. More generally, players’ preference for their similar type maybe interpreted as a matter 
of homophily. Empirical literature has shown that informal segregation spontaneously emerges in 
relation to discrimination on the grounds of specific individual characteristics and/or as a result of 
peer pressures (McPherson et al., 2001). SNS studies have shown that online social networks are so 
pervasive that they may well be considered as a crucial individual characteristic that prompt a 
negative bias towards non-users and vice versa8. 
On the other hand, SN players may get different payoffs when interacting with others of the same 
type depending on whether the interaction takes place online or offline. Several experiments, in fact, 
have shown that people behave online in a very peculiar way in respect to face-to-face interaction. 
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Kiesler et al. (1984) observed that computer-mediated communication entails anonymity, reduced 
self-regulation and reduced self-awareness. ‘The overall weakening of self- or normative regulation 
might be similar to what happens when people become less self-aware and submerged in a group, 
that is, deindividuated’ (p. 1126). Deindividuation has, in turn, been found to be conducive to 
disinhibition and lack of restraint (Diener, 1979). Siegel et al. (1983) found that people in 
computer-mediated groups were more aggressive than they were in face-to-face groups, as 
measured by uninhibited verbal behavior. Deregulation and disinhibition encourage “online 
incivility”, which includes aggressive or disrespectful behaviors, vile comments, online harassment 
and hate speech. 
Antoci et al. (2015b), Sabatini et al. (2015) and Sabatini and Sarracino (2015) argued that online 
incivility may be a major cause of frustration and dissatisfaction, which suggests that the benefits of 
the interaction between SN players could also be negative ( < 0) if the interaction takes place via 
SNS, and positive ( > 0)	if the interaction occurs face-to-face. 
 
3.2 Evolutionary Dynamics 
We assume that the adoption process of strategies SN, NS and NP is determined by the well-known 
replicator equations (see, e.g., Weibull 1995): 
   ! = ( − """") 		! = ( − """")     (1) 	! = ( − """") 
 
Where! , ! , and !  represent the time derivatives of the functions () , () , and () , 
respectively, and: 
 """" =  +  +  
 
is the population-wide average payoff of strategies.  
Dynamics (1) are defined in the simplex S illustrated in Figure 1, where , ,  ≥ 0 and  + +  = 1 hold. The vertices of S, that is the vectors # = (1,0,0), # = (0,1,0), and # = (0,0,1) 
correspond to the states in which all individuals adopt a unique strategy, respectively SN, NS or NP.  
We denote #$ − #% the edge of S joining #$with #%; thus # − # is the edge where only strategies SN 
and NS are present in the population (see Figure 1), # − # is the edge where only strategies SN 
and NP are present, and # − # is the edge where only strategies NS and NP are present. 
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Figure 1. The simplex S, where , ,  ≥ 0 and  +  +  = 1 hold. The vertices # = (1,0,0), # = (0,1,0), and # = (0,0,1) correspond to the states in which all individuals adopt a unique strategy, 
respectively SN, NS or NP. 
 
 
It is easy to check that dynamics (1) can be written in the following form (see, e.g., Bomze 1983): 
 !$ = $(#$ ∙ '( − ( ∙ '(),			) = 1,2,3    (2) 
 
Where ,!  represents the time derivative -$/- of $(), 	( is the vector ( = (, , ), and A is 
the payoff matrix: 
 
' = /(1 − ) +  + (1 − ) (1 − ) + (1 − ) (1 − )(1 − ) + (1 − ) (1 − ) +  (1 − )   0  (3) 
 
We will analyze dynamics (2) under the following assumptions: 
 
Assumption I (1,0) > (1,0), that is  + (1 − ) > (1 − ): the SN strategy is better performing 
than the NS strategy in a social context where all individuals adopt the SN strategy (i.e.,	 =1,  = 0). 
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Assumption II (0,1) > (0,1), that is  > (1 − ): the NS strategy is better performing than the SN 
strategy in a social context where all individuals adopt the NS strategy (i.e.,	 = 0,  = 1). 
 
Assumption I establishes a minimal condition for segregation. This condition is always satisfied if β 
and γ, i.e., respectively the benefits that SN players get when they interact online and face-to-face 
with other SN players, are positive and ε, i.e., the reward that NS players get when interacting with 
SN players face-to-face, is negative or equal to zero. In this case, SN players will discriminate those 
who do not use online social networks, and NS players will not have any specific interest in 
engaging with them. More generally, Assumption I is satisfied if the value of ε is lower enough than 
β and γ. 
Assumption II requires that the benefit δ obtained by SN players that meet NS individuals face-to-
face is lower enough than the benefit obtained by NS players when they meet face-to-face 
individuals of their same type. This condition is certainly satisfied if η≥δ. In this case, NS players 
discriminate, in face-to-face encounters, those who adopt the SN strategy.  
 
4. Results 
It is well-known that dynamics (2) do not change if an arbitrary constant is added to each column of 
A (see, e.g., Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988; p. 126). So, we can replace matrix A, in equations (2), 
with the following normalized matrix B with the first row made of zeros: 
 
1 = /0 0 02 3 4- # 50 = 
 
= 6 0 0 0(1 − ) −  − (1 − )  − (1 − ) 0 −  − (1 − )  − (1 − ) 7  (4) 
 
According to Assumptions I and II, 2 < 0  and 3 > 0  hold. Furthermore, 5 > 0  always. The 
dynamic regimes that can be observed under Assumptions I and II can be classified taking into 
account the following results. 
 
Proposition 1 
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1) The stationary state #	–where all individuals play SN– is a sink (i.e., it is locally attractive) if the 
following condition holds (see matrix (4)): 
 - =  −  − (1 − )<0  i.e., 		 <  + (1 − )   (5) 
 
While it is a saddle point if (5) does not hold (in such a case, the stable arm lies in the edge # − #, 
while the unstable arm belongs to the edge # − #). 
2) The stationary state # -where all individuals play NS- is a sink if the following condition holds 
(see matrix (4)): 
 # − 3 =  − <0  i.e.,		 <      (6) 
 
While it is a saddle point if (6) does not hold (in such a case, the stable arm lies in the edge # − #, 
while the unstable arm belongs to the edge # − #). 
3) The stationary state #–where all individuals play NP– is always a sink. 
 
Proof: See the mathematical appendix A. 
 
Let us remember that: 
• 1 − 	and   are, respectively, the probabilities to be a Wmode-individual or an Lmode-
individual (playing either the SN or the NS strategy), while n is the probability for an 
individual playing the SN strategy to be interacting online via SNS. 
• The parameter α measures the payoff of a Wmode-individual. 
• The parameter  measures the benefits for an Lmode-individual choosing the SN strategy 
when she is interacting via a SNS with individuals of the same type.  
• The parameters   and δ measure the benefits of an Lmode-individual choosing the SN 
strategy when she is interacting via face-to-face encounters with, respectively, individuals of 
the same type and with Lmode-individuals choosing the NS strategy. 
• The parameters   and ε measure the benefits of an Lmode-individual adopting the NS 
strategy when she is interacting face-to-face with, respectively, individuals of the same type 
and with Lmode-individuals adopting SN. 
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Note that conditions (5) and (6) are simultaneously satisfied if the value of the parameter   – 
measuring the (constant) payoff of the NP strategy is low enough. Differently from # and	#, the 
stationary state # is always a sink, whatever the value of the parameter  > 0 is. 
When the pure population states #, #, and # are sinks, they are also Nash equilibria (see, e.g., 
Weibull, 1995). In such a case, they can be interpreted as stable social conventions representing 
self-enforcing configurations of the social environment.  
In our model, individuals’ welfare evaluated at #, #, and # is measured, respectively, by: 
 
   (1,0) = (1 − ) +  + (1 − ) 
   (0,1) = (1 − ) +  
    =  
 
The following proposition deals with Pareto dominance relationships among the stationary states #, #, and #. 
 
Proposition 2. The stationary state # –where all individuals play SN– Pareto dominates the 
stationary state #	–where all individuals play NS- (i.e., (1,0) > (0,1)) if: 
  <  + (1 − )     (7) 
 
and Pareto dominates the stationary state #–where all individuals play NP- (i.e., (1,0) >) if: 
  <  + (1 − )     (8) 
 
The stationary state #–where all individuals play NS– Pareto dominates the stationary state #–
where all individuals play NP- (i.e.,	(1,0) > ) if: 
  <        (9) 
 
Proof: Straightforward. 
 
It is important to note that (8) and (9) coincide, respectively, with the stability conditions (5) and (6). 
Therefore, if #and # are sinks, then they Pareto dominate the stationary state #–where individuals 
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withdraw from social participation. This implies that, in the context in which at least one of the 
stationary states # and #are sinks, the stationary state #	(which is always locally attractive) can 
be interpreted as a social poverty trap. In the trap, everyone withdraws from social participation and 
devotes all of their available time to work and “private” activities, e.g., work and consumption that 
do not entail any significant social relationship. The “social poverty” that derives from this situation 
–manifesting, for example, in the scarcity of participation opportunities and in the strengthening of 
materialistic values– makes social interaction difficult and unrewarding.  
Also note that the Pareto dominance relationship between # and # (see (7) does not depend on the 
stability conditions (5) and (6), and, consequently, 	#  may Pareto dominate #  or vice versa, 
independently from their stability properties.  
The following proposition concerns the existence and stability properties of the other possible 
stationary states of dynamics (2), that is, the stationary states where at least two, among the 
available strategies, are adopted by (strictly) positive shares of the population.  
 
Proposition 3 
1) A unique stationary state in the interior of S (i.e., with $ > 0	all ) = 1,2,3), where all strategies 
are played, exists if: 
 2# − 3- = 8(1 − ) − (1 − ) + 	(1 − )9 + 
    +8( − ) + (1 − ) − 9 > 0   (10) 
 
Such a stationary state is always a source (i.e., it is repulsive). If condition (10) does not hold, then 
no stationary state exists in the interior of S. 
2) A unique stationary state always exists in the edge # − # (not coinciding with either # or #) 
of the simplex S (see Figure 1); it is a saddle point (with unstable manifold lying in # − #) if the 
stationary state in the interior of S exists (see point one of this proposition), otherwise it is a source. 
3) A unique stationary state exists in the edge # − # if - < 0 (see condition (5), and it is always a 
saddle point (with unstable manifold lying in # − #). If - ≥ 0, then no stationary state exists in # − #. 
4) A unique stationary state exists in the edge # − # if # − 3 < 0 (see condition (6), and it is 
always a saddle point (with unstable manifold lying in # − #). If # − 3 ≥ 0, then no stationary 
state exists in # − #. 
 
Proof: See the mathematical appendix A. 
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5. Classification of Dynamic Regimes 
Bomze (1983) provided a complete classification of two-dimensional replicator equations. The 
above propositions allow us to select, among all of the phase portraits illustrated in Bomze’s paper, 
those that can be observed under the dynamics (2). In Figures 2-8, sinks (i.e., attractive stationary 
states) are indicated by full dots, sources (i.e., repulsive stationary states) are indicated by open dots 
and saddle points by drawing their stable and unstable branches. The basins of attraction of #, #, 
and #  are, respectively, in yellow, blue and pink. According to Proposition 3 (and to Bomze's 
classification), every trajectory starting from an initial distribution of strategies (0), (0),and	(0)	–neither belonging to a one-dimensional stable manifold of a saddle point nor coinciding 
with a stationary state where more than one strategy is adopted– approaches one of the pure 
population stationary states # , # , and # . In the following subsections, we will present the 
complete classification of the possible dynamics regimes that can be observed under equations (2). 
 
5.1. Regime One: Conditions (5) and (6) Hold 
In this context, all of the vertices # = (1,0,0), # = (0,1,0), and # = (0,0,1) are simultaneously 
attractive and the regimes illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 can be observed. The former –
corresponding to the phase portrait number 35 (PP#35) in Bomze’s (1983) classification– occurs 
when 2# − 3- ≤ 0 (i.e., when a stationary state in the interior of S does not exist, see condition (10), 
while the latter –corresponding to PP#7– occurs when 2# − 3- > 0. 
In this context, the stationary state # = (0,0,1)	–where all the individuals play the NP strategy– is 
Pareto dominated by the other locally attracting stationary states. This suggests that the NP strategy 
can be interpreted as an adaptive behavior that agents may want to play to protect themselves from 
situations of relational poverty and decay of the surrounding social environment. As clearly 
illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, these regimes are strongly path dependent. If the initial distribution of 
the different forms of participation is close enough to # = (1,0,0), i.e., if (0) is high enough and 	(0) and		(0) are low enough, then the economy converges to #, where all individuals adopt 
the SN strategy. On the other hand, if the initial distribution is close enough to # or #, then the 
economy converges to # or #. 
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Figure 2. Dynamic regime in which all of the vertices # = (1,0,0), # = (0,1,0), and # = (0,0,1) are 
simultaneously attractive and a stationary state in the interior of S does not exist. The basins of attraction 
of #, # and # are, respectively, in yellow, blue and pink. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Dynamic regime in which all of the vertices # = (1,0,0), # = (0,1,0), and # = (0,0,1) are 
simultaneously attractive and a stationary state in the interior of S exists. The basins of attraction of #, # 
and # are, respectively, in yellow, blue and pink. 
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5.2. Regime Two: Condition (5) Holds, But (6) Does Not Hold 
In this context, the vertices # = (1,0,0) and # = (0,0,1) are attractive, while # = (0,1,0) is a 
saddle point. The regimes are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Dynamic regime in which only the vertices # = (1,0,0) and # = (0,0,1) are attractive, and a 
stationary state in the interior of S does not exist. The basins of attraction of #and # are, respectively, in 
yellow and pink. 
 
 
The regime in Figure 4 –corresponding to PP#37 of Bomze’s classification– occurs when 2# −3- ≤ 0 (i.e., when a stationary state in the interior of S does not exist, see condition (10), while the 
latter –corresponding to PP#9– occurs when 2# − 3- > 0 . In this context, the stationary state # = (0,0,1)	–where all the individuals play the NP strategy– is Pareto dominated by # = (1,0,0)	–
where all the individuals play the SN strategy. Furthermore, the stationary state # = (0,1,0)	–
where all the individuals play the NS strategy– is Pareto dominated by both the stationary states # = (1,0,0)	and # = (0,0,1). 
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Figure 5. Dynamic regime in which only the vertices # = (1,0,0) and # = (0,0,1) are attractive, and a 
stationary state in the interior of S exists. The basins of attraction of #and # are, respectively, in yellow 
and pink. 
 
 
5.3. Regime Three: Condition (6) Holds, But (5) Does Not Hold 
In this context, the vertices # = (0,1,0) and # = (0,0,1) are attractive, while # = (1,0,0) is a 
saddle point. The regimes are illustrated in Figures 6 and 7. The regime in Figure 6 –corresponding 
to PP#37 of Bomze’s classification– occurs when 2# − 3- ≤ 0 (i.e., when a stationary state in the 
interior of S does not exists, see condition (10), while the latter –corresponding to PP#9– occurs 
when 2# − 3- > 0. In this context, the stationary state # = (0,0,1)	–where all the individuals play 
the NP strategy– is Pareto dominated by # = (0,1,0)	–where all the individuals play the NS 
strategy. Furthermore, the stationary state # = (1,0,0)–where all the individuals play the SN 
strategy– is Pareto dominated by both the stationary states # = (0,1,0) and # = (0,0,1). 
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Figure 6. Dynamic regime in which only the vertices # = (0,1,0) and # = (0,0,1) are attractive, and a 
stationary state in the interior of S does not exist. The basins of attraction of		#	and # are, respectively, 
in blue and pink. 
 
 
Figure 7. Dynamic regime in which only the vertices # = (0,1,0) and # = (0,0,1) are attractive, and a 
stationary state in the interior of S exists. The basins of attraction of # and # are, respectively, in blue 
and pink. 
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5.4. Regime Four: Neither Condition (5) Nor (6) Hold 
In this context, 2# − 3- ≤ 0	always holds (i.e., a stationary state in the interior of S does not exist), 
and the unique dynamic regime that can be observed is illustrated in Figure 8 –corresponding to 
PP#42 of Bomze’s classification. In this regime, the unique attractive stationary state is # =(0,0,1), where all individuals withdraw from social participation, which Pareto dominates both the 
stationary states # = (1,0,0) and	#	 = (0,1,0). 
This extreme scenario may be interpreted as the result of exogenous conditions of social decay, 
which make social participation (in any form) poorly rewarding. For instance, the scarcity of 
infrastructures for face-to-face interactions (e.g., meeting places such as public parks, theatres, 
clubs, associations) lowers the reward provided by the NS strategy. Furthermore, the poverty of 
technological infrastructures for fast Internet access lowers the reward associated with the SN 
strategy. 
 
 
Figure 8. Dynamic regime in which only the vertex # = (0,0,1) is attractive. Its basin of attraction is in 
pink. 
 
 
5.5 Discrimination and the Social Poverty Trap 
The classification of dynamic regimes illustrated in Figures 2-8 suggests that the structure of the 
basin of attraction of the social poverty trap e3 crucially depends on the propensity for 
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discrimination of the two sub-populations of socially active individuals. The higher the propensity 
for discrimination, the greater the probability that individuals will ultimately segregate themselves, 
making society fall into the trap.  
In fact, the less gratifying the interaction between SN and NS players, the more attractive the social 
isolation strategy NP becomes. If the rewards δ and ε that SN and NS players get when they interact 
face-to-face is particularly low, then they both might be tempted to withdraw from social interaction, 
whatever the initial share of the sub-population adopting either SN or NS is. Notice that condition 
(10) (when it holds, then a stationary state in the interior of the simplex S exists) is never satisfied if 
the rewards δ and ε are negative and low enough. In such a context, if the stationary states e1 and e2 
are attractive (see the regime shown in Figure 2), then the basin of attraction of the social poverty 
trap e3 is so large that it includes the area bordering the edge # − #, where the NP strategy is 
almost extinct, the majority of the population socially participates and the two strategies of social 
participation (NS and SN) are uniformly distributed. 
However, the basin of attraction of the social poverty trap e3 does not include the areas in close 
proximity to the edge # − # if the rewards δ and ε are high enough and, therefore, condition (10) 
is satisfied (see Figure 3). This result suggests that, if the two sub-populations of SN and NS players 
have a limited tendency to discriminate each other –which happens if the rewards δ and ε that the 
two types of player get when they interact face-to-face are high enough– then society will less 
likely fall into the social poverty trap in the cases in which the initial level of social participation is 
high, even if the two strategies NS and SN are uniformly distributed, as it happens in the dynamic 
regime illustrated in Figure 3. On the other hand, when the reward given by the interaction between 
SN and NS players is particularly low, the two strategies ultimately may crowd out each other. A 
similar crowding out effect also applies to the dynamic regimes illustrated in Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
In these cases, the basin of attraction of the social poverty trap e3 is so large that it also includes the 
areas in close proximity to the edge # − #. This means that society can converge to e3 even if the 
initial share of the sub-population adopting the social participation strategies SN and NS is 
particularly high.  
 
6. Supplementary Result: A Prediction of the Model 
There is growing empirical evidence showing that face-to-face interaction is associated with higher 
levels of well-being than SNS-mediated interactions. Using Italian cross-sectional data, Sabatini 
and Sarracino (2014b) found that subjective well-being is positively correlated with face-to-face 
encounters and negatively correlated with SNS-mediated interactions. Helliwell and Huang (2013) 
reached a similar conclusion by comparing the well-being effects of online and offline friendships 
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in a Canadian sample. Kross et al. (2013) examined this issue using experience sampling. The 
authors text-messaged people five times per day for two weeks to test how offline and Facebook-
mediated interactions correlate with aspects of subjective well-being (SWB). Results indicate that 
Facebook use predicts negative shifts in SWB, while face-to-face interactions show no significant 
effect. Based on a survey conducted on a representative sample of 2,000 French Facebook users, 
Pénard and Mayol (2015) found that Facebook interferes with subjective well-being through its 
effects on friendships and self-esteem. Their results show that people who also use the network to 
seek social approval in the form of more Likes tend to be more unsatisfied with their life. Similarly, 
Sabatini and Sarracino (2015b) drew on Italian representative data to show that the use of SNS is 
associated with lower levels of satisfaction with respondents’ income, differently from face-to-face 
interactions, thereby suggesting that the use of online networks can raise material aspirations with 
detrimental effects for SWB. 
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests the convenience of further analyzing the dynamics 
occurring in the region of the simplex where: 
 (, ) > (, ) 
 
In this region, the reward provided by a strategy of social participation exclusively based on face-
to-face interactions is higher than the benefits associated with the use of SNS (the SN strategy). The 
following proposition allows the prediction of the possible evolution of the shares of the population , ,  adopting the three strategies ina society, starting from an initial configuration of payoffs 
that are consistent with the evidence mentioned above, i.e., where: 
 ((0), (0)) > ((0), (0)) 
 
 
Proposition 4 
The set in which (, ) > (, ) 
 
holds (where the payoff of strategy SN is lower than that of strategy NS)and the set in which 
 (, ) < (, ) 
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holds (where the payoff of strategy SN is higher than that of strategy NS) are invariant under 
dynamics (2). That is, every trajectory starting from the former cannot enter the latter, and vice 
versa. 
 
Proof: See the mathematical appendix B. 
 
Proposition 4 states that, if the payoff associated with NS is initially higher than the one associated 
with SN, then it will always be higher than that provided by SN, unless exogenous perturbations will 
change the model’s parameters. As a result, the economy cannot converge to the stationary state # = (1,0,0) , where all individuals adopt the SN strategy if starting from the region in 
which		 >  holds. This means that almost all of the trajectories starting from such a region 
will converge to e2 –where all individuals socially participate by exclusive means of face-to-face 
interactions- or to e3 –where nobody participates. Only one trajectory can reach the edge # − # 
where the NS and the NP strategies coexist. In any case, the analysis of dynamics suggests that 
society will converge to equilibria where no one adopts the SN strategy. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we developed an evolutionary game model to study the dynamics of different modes 
of interaction in an era that is characterized by a steep rise in the use of online social networks and 
the supposed decline in face-to-face social participation. In our framework, individuals can choose 
to withdraw from social relations or interact with others by means of SNS and/or face-to-face 
encounters. The analysis showed that, depending on the configuration of payoff and the initial 
distribution of the various modes of participation in the population, different Nash equilibria could 
be reached. If we allow a configuration of payoff that is compatible with individuals’ preference for 
similar others, then discrimination will lead to the segregation of the three sub-populations 
accounted for in the analysis and, ultimately, to the survival of only one of the three. Every 
trajectory starting from an initial distribution of strategies neither belonging to a one-dimensional 
stable manifold of a saddle point nor coinciding with a stationary state, where more than one 
strategy is adopted, will approach one of the pure population stationary states. 
If the reward for social withdrawal is low enough, then the stationary states, where all individuals 
play one of the two strategies of participation, e1 and e2, are locally attractive. In this case, they both 
Pareto dominate the stationary state, where everyone withdraws from social interaction, e3. 
However, there is no Pareto dominance relationship between e1 and e2. 
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If e1 and e2 are attractive, then the former can Pareto dominate the latter or vice versa, but both the 
equilibria Pareto dominate the social poverty trap e3. The dynamic regimes are strongly path 
dependent. If the initial distribution of the three strategies is close enough to e1, then the economy 
will converge to e1. The same can be said for e2and e3. The social poverty trap e3, on the other hand, 
is always a sink, whatever the payoff of social withdrawal is. In this scenario, the withdrawal from 
social participation can be interpreted as a defensive behavior in the sense theorized by Hirsch 
(1976). Individuals, in fact, might want to cope with the deterioration in the social environment 
surrounding them and/or the increasing busyness related to their material aspirations by choosing to 
limit their social relationships to a minimum. This result is related to previous research that studied 
how growth may cause negative externalities on social relationships and social cohesion (Putnam, 
2000; Bartolini and Bonatti, 2008; Antoci et al., 2007, 2012b, 2013; Bartolini et al., 2013; Bartolini 
and Sarracino, 2015a). These studies claimed that the rise in material aspirations and the need to 
work more might tighten time constraints, causing deterioration in the social environment and 
prompting a gradual withdrawal from face-to-face interactions  
Social withdrawal is self-feeding, in that the higher the share of the population renouncing to social 
participation, the poorer the social environment becomes, for example, in terms of social 
engagement opportunities. People playing the NP strategy will ultimately decide to segregate 
themselves from the rest of the population.  
In all of the possible cases, corresponding to the stationary states e1, e2 and e3, the segregation 
entailed by individuals’ tendency for discrimination will lead to the survival of only one of the 
initial sub-populations.  
The model also allowed us to study the future of social participation in a world in which social 
interaction via online networks is less rewarding than offline interaction. This scenario is 
particularly interesting as it is consistent with findings from the most recent empirical studies 
comparing the effect of face-to-face and SNS-mediated interactions on individuals’ well-being. Our 
results suggest that dynamics starting from this scenario will lead the SN strategy to extinction, 
which entails that Facebook and alike will disappear.  
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Mathematical Appendix A 
Dynamics (2) is equivalent (see Hofbauer, 1981) to the Lotka-Volterra system: 
 ?! = ?(2 + 3?)      (11) @! = @(- + #? + 5@)      (12)  
 
via the coordinate change: 
 
	 ABAC 	 BABAC 	 CABAC    (13) 
 
From which ? = 2 1⁄  and @ = 3 1⁄ . 
Please note that, by the coordinate change (13), the edge # − # of the simplex S (see Figure 1) 
corresponds to the positive semi-axis @ = 0 of the plane (X,Y), the edge # − # corresponds to the 
positive semi-axis ? = 0 and the vertex # corresponds to the point (X,Y)=(0,0) (see Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9. Arrow diagram of the Lotka-Volterra system. The edge # − # of the simplex S corresponds to 
the positive semi-axis @ = 0 of the plane (X,Y), the edge # − # corresponds to the positive semi-axis ? = 0, and the vertex #  corresponds to the point (X,Y)=(0,0). The set in which  >   holds 
coincides with the region on the left of the vertical straight line	? = −2/3. 
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According to equation (11), ?! = 0  holds along the axis ? = 0  and along the vertical straight 
line		? = −2 3⁄ >0; furthermore ?! > 0 (?! < 0) holds on the right  (respectively, on the left) of ? = −2 3⁄ . According to equation (12), @! = 0 holds along the axis @ = 0 and along the straight 
line 	@ = −- 5⁄ − (# 5⁄ )? . Furthermore, 	@! > 0(@! < 0) holds above  (respectively, below) @ =−- 5⁄ − (# 5⁄ )?. 
Remembering that 2 < 0, 3 > 0, and	5 > 0, we have that a unique stationary state with X>0 and 
Y>0, (?", @") = E−2/3,−-/5 + (2#)/(35)F , exists if and only if 	2# > 3-  (condition (10) of 
Proposition 3). The Jacobian matrix of system (11)-(12), evaluated at (?", @"), is a triangular matrix: 
 
G(?", @") = H3?" 0@" 5@"I 
 
With eigenvalues 	3?" > 0 (in direction of = −2 3⁄  ) and 5@" > 0. So (?", @") is always a repulsive 
node (this completes the proof of point one of Proposition 3). 
By following similar steps, it is easy to check that: 
1) The Lotka-Volterra system (11)-(12) always admits a unique stationary state (?, @) = (−2 3, 0)⁄ , 
with −2/3 > 0, belonging to the positive semi-axis @ = 0 (corresponding to the edge # − # of 
the simplex S, see Figure 1). Such a stationary state is a saddle point (with unstable manifold lying 
in @ = 0, and stable manifold lying in ? = −2 3⁄ ) if the internal stationary state (?", @") exists; 
otherwise it is a source (point two of Proposition 3). 
2) The Lotka-Volterra system (11)-(12) admits a unique stationary state (?, @) = (0, −- 5⁄ ), with −- 5⁄ > 0, belonging to the positive semi-axis ? = 0 (corresponding to the edge # − # of the 
simplex S) if - < 0. Such a stationary state is always a saddle point with unstable manifold lying in ? = 0. If - ≥ 0, then no stationary state with @ > 0 exists in the positive semi-axis ? = 0	(point 
three of Proposition 3). 
3) The state (?, @) = (0,0) (corresponding to the vertex # of the simplex S, see Figure 1) is always 
a stationary state; it is a saddle point (with unstable manifold lying in ? = 0, and stable manifold 
lying in @ = 0) if - ≥ 0  (i.e., if the stationary state in the semi-axis ? = 0 does not exist, see point 
2 above), otherwise it is a sink (point one of  Proposition 1). 
The stability properties of the stationary states # and # (points two to three of Proposition 1), and 
the existence and stability properties of the stationary state belonging to the edge # − # (point 
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four of Proposition 3)9 can be easily analyzed by applying Propositions 1, 2 and 5 in Bomze (1983), 
who provided a complete classification of two-dimensional replicator equations. 
 
Mathematical Appendix B 
The condition: 
 (, ) > (, ) 
 
can be written as follows: 
 2 + 3 < 0, 3 < −2, ? < − JK, 
 
where	? = 2 1⁄ . Consequently, in the positive quadrant of the plane (?, @), the set in which  >  holds coincides with the region on the left of the vertical straight line (see Figure 9): 
 
? = − JK>0      (14) 
 
Along the straight line (14),	?! = 0 holds, while the set in which  < 	holds corresponds to 
the region on the right of (14). Since (14) cannot be crossed by trajectories (see Figure 9), the two 
regions separated by (14) are invariant. Consequently, every trajectory starting from the region in 
which  <  cannot converge to the stationary state (?, @) = (0,0), which corresponds to 
the stationary state # = (1,0,0). This completes the proof of Proposition 4. 
                                                        
9
 Such stationary states do not correspond to stationary states of the Lotka-Volterra system (11)-(12). 
